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Translating (With) the Speculum 
Barbara Godard 
Reading "with" 
"With" is the operative term. In this essay, I am concerned with a 
theory of translation as combinatory rather than substitution as I read 
with Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous who analyze and set in play 
theories of exchange of signs, of languages and bodies. 
Gender as the (im)possibility of translation 
Gender I understand to designate the apparatus of production of sexual 
difference as binary (asymmetric) relations. A system regulating 
differences, gender inflects regimes of sign relations including those of 
exchange. This might be rewritten as "including those of translation 
(transcoding)." The movement from "exchange" to "translation" takes 
place within semiotics when Saussure's concern with relations and his 
description of signification as the exchange of values within a system 
(Saussure, p. 115) is reworked by Hjelmslev into a "general calculus" 
of dependences in sign systems understood as "abstract transformation 
systems" characterized by "translatability" (Hjelmslev, p. 23, pp. 
108-109). Society is conceptualized in terms of a theory of communica-
tion where rules of kinship and linguistic rules, along with economic 
rules, set in place systems of circulation of symbolic value (Lévi-
Strauss, 1967, p. 82). Through the consolidation of inner bonds, a 
collective identity is produced for each group differentiated through an 
exchange, for each clan, for each language. In an exchange under the 
rule of reciprocity, groups fix their interrelation as one of difference 
with respect to an inside and an outside. In this way, are produced 
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woman as a category within a kinship system of sexual difference and 
translation within a signifying system of linguistic difference. Relatio-
nal terms, both distinguish and bind to a common internally differentia-
ted identity, but are not identities. Performances, rather, in that like 
metaphor they deploy performatives, promising rather than giving 
(Derrida, 1982, p. 209). 
I shall attempt to explore the overlapping relational systems of 
gender and translation through the triad law, desire, language in various 
formulations — and critiques — of the rule of exogamy. For anthropo-
logists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, (and before him a large group that 
includes Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss working on the economy 
of the gift or potlatch) exogamy or a generalized economy of exchange 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 63) is crucial in the reproduction of culture, 
where culture is understood primarily as a set of signifying practices. 
Feminists, especially Luce Irigaray, have offered a critical exegesis of 
the operations of this construction of exchange and elaborated an 
alternative economy of relations. From the "Traffic in Women" 
(Goldman) there is a move to "reading with!' women (Cixous, 1990). 
From substitution to interconnection. I shall first read Luce Irigaray's 
work as a theory of sign manipulation, that is, as a general theory of 
translation or semiotic transcoding (Jakobson, 1963, p. 79) with which, 
in a second phase, to examine the operations of a restricted theory of 
translation or translation proper (Jakobson, 1963, p. 79) as manifest in 
the practice of translating French feminist theory. Translating by "lapse 
and bounds" (Cixous, 1986, p. 96). My discussion will centre on the 
exegesis of metaphor and metonymy, that is on the relations of what 
Irigaray terms "the mechanics of solids" and "the mechanics of fluids" 
to economies of signification (Irigaray, 1985b). 
Translation, living on... 
Andrew Benjamin has argued that "the possibility of translation is the 
possibility of philosophy" (Benjamin, p. 4) which relation I shall rewrite 
as "the possibility of translation is the possibility of theory." Transla-
tion is linked to the "possibility of reinscription" so that translation 
becomes "the question of what allows texts/language to live on"... 
"[Theory] lives on in translation and [...] translation survives even 
philosophy [theory]" (Benjamin, p. 85). Translation confronts the text 
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as other, "as the site of differential plurality" (Benjamin, p. 84) and 
allows for the interpretation of the word as a site of conflict, as the 
"recognition of non-correspondence as non-correspondence" (Benjamin, 
p. 176). Interpretation is a process in which what is presented is not the 
object of interpretation, rather as it proceeds, an initial presentation 
points to something further that was not, at first, presented. What 
seemed to be original is not independent of the interpretive chain, but 
"always already a translation" (Benjamin, p. 147). In Benjamin's view, 
there is no inside/outside of translation. 
This (im)possibility of translation is the condition of interpreta-
tion, of theory. Concern is shifted from the "relationship between the 
interpretation and object of interpretation" to "the implications and 
presuppositions of that particular interpretation or translation" (Benja-
min, p. 179), from axiological issues of truthfulness to ethical questions 
of effect. The capacity for reinterpretation admits the possibility of a 
conflict of interpretations. Nonetheless, a "philosophy of difference," 
Benjamin argues, is still philosophy (Benjamin, p. 178). Taking 
philosophy/theory (in)fidelity. There is no inside/outside to theory: 
theory/reinterpretation as the (im)possibility of translation. 
Extending this line of specul(ariz)aüon, on the imbrication of 
interpretation, difference, translation, I want to add another figure of 
difference, gender. The (im)possibility of gender as the (im)possible 
condition of translation. Gender, like translation a sign system, figures 
both "literally" and "figuratively" in this analysis. For gender may be 
constructed as a "naturalistic paradigm" establishing causal continuity 
among sex, gender and desire, or it may be understood as an "authentic-
expressive paradigm" where some "true self is revealed in sex, gender 
and desire (Butler, p. 22). On the other hand, gender may be shown to 
be produced within the presupposed binary categories as an effect of a 
history of practices and discourses. Indeed, this very instability calls into 
question the distinction between "literal" and "figurative," as it does a 
substantializing view of gender and, as I hope to show, of translation. 
Somewhere in this shifting terrain between trope (metaphor) and 
translation lies my subject. Despite their differing semantic fields there 
are overlaps in the connotations of the terms. One Greek term for 
translation is metapherein (another is hermeneuien). In Latin, both 
transferre and translatare are terms for all forms of metaphor as well 
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as for the transfer of legal jurisdiction. Whether translation is a trope 
like metaphor, in which the vehicle is less important than the tenor 
(signifier less than signified) in a general movement of meaning, or 
whether what is carried across from the words of one language into 
another is transformed (signifier producing other signifiers/signifieds) 
is a point of debate in translation theory. Is translation a form of 
mediation or one of construction? Does it function within a regime of 
truth or in a regime of interpretation? 
At stake is whether the word translation is understood in its 
general or restricted forms (Berman, p. 292). Within a restricted 
economy, translation is explored in its unique relationship to another 
text which gives it depth of signification as the reworking of a specific 
text within a specific context Translation, then, engages with issues of 
the (re)covery of meaning. A general theory of translation, on the 
contrary, elaborates a theory of intercommunication from the horizon of 
translation. Translation in this case, like anthropology in Lévi-Strauss' 
analysis (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 95), is "the system of systems, the one 
which permits the interpretation of the others" (Berman, p. 292). Any 
type of "change" in knowledge, in experience, as well as in aesthetics 
is understood to be translation: intercultural, interliterary, interlinguistic 
communication are all "carrying across." Under such a general theory, 
any activity of interpretation or rewriting (adaptation, literary criticism, 
book review, historiography, prefatory introduction, (Lefevere, p. 235)), 
as I have just tried to illustrate, any activity of doubling (metaphor, 
quotation, parody) may be considered "translation." This semantic — 
and epistemic — expansion evacuates any specific meaning one may 
give to the term: translation becomes synonymous with the heterogenei-
ty of the sign, always already read and translated, infinitely other. 
Translation in excess of interpretation. Living on. 
The circulation of signs/women 
In his Introduction to A Theory of Semiotics, Umberto Eco argues that 
"theoretical research is a form of social practice" on the grounds that 
culture may be studied semiotically: "every [cultural] entity can become 
a semiotic phenomenon" becoming the interprétant of another sign-vehi-
cle in the continuous process of communicative exchanges that is 
culture (Eco, pp. 28-29). Entities may have both symbolic value, as 
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objects, and sign-values in a system of signification. The example Eco 
proposes is the "exchange of women." Women's symbolic value as 
objects (as bodies) puts them in opposition within the system to other 
women. When she enters into the system of kinship as a "wife," woman 
is "no longer merely a physical body: she is a sign which connotes a 
system of social obligations" (Eco, p. 26). What Eco advances as a 
presupposition of semiotics is the thesis of Claude Lévi-Strauss, so 
important to the development of both structuralism and feminism, that 
kinship is a structure through which men and women are positioned 
through complex systems of rules and rituals to be performed by each 
sex. Kinship systems are: 
a kind of language, a set of processes permitting the establish-
ment, between individuals and groups, of a certain type of 
communication. That the mediating factor, in this case, should 
be the women of the group, who are circulated between clans, 
lineages, or families, in place of the words of the group, which 
are circulated between individuals, does not at all change the 
fact that the essential aspect of the phenomenon is identitical 
in both cases. (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 60) 
Women circulating between groups — translating. 
In elaborating the concept of woman as sign within a kinship system, 
Lévi-Strauss developed Saussure's hints for a semiology when he 
suggested that the system of differential relations along synchronic and 
diachronic axes he had outlined for the operation of linguistic signs 
could be generalized to other kinds of sign systems. For Saussure, 
"Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of 
each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others" 
(p. 114). Value of words lies in their "exchangeability," since words 
are interchanged with each other, but is also a measure of their 
difference. There are no positive terms, only relational ones (Saussure, 
p. 1 IS). Value is not intrinsic or fixed, but is a function of positioning 
in a system of relational differences, where the value of a term is 
"determined by its environment" (Saussure, p. 116), established along 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes through operations of substitution 
and combination. In this, the senders and receivers of a signifier are part 
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of the system and are constituted as speaking subjects in relation to each 
other and to the system through relations of exchange. 
As Lévi-Strauss argues, kinship is a system producing woman 
as object of exchange that becomes a sign of the institution of culture. 
Situated within the kinship structures as not-men, women are "produ-
ced" as wife, mother, etc. Woman functions as "negative" difference 
in this system through the Oedipal complex and exogamy whereby 
difference is instituted and inscribed in the socio-symbolic order. Social 
existence is "the exchange of complementary values" (Lévi-Strauss, 
1967, p. 61). The exchange is not simply the "communication of 
women": rather it is the putting in place of sexual relations and the 
institution of subjectivity through the prohibition of incest. Mother/son 
relations are regulated through this system by the introduction of a third 
term, either father or brother, to mediate and transform the symmetry 
considered to be the deathly impossibility of culture. To break up the 
circular nature of the biological pattern, the maternal uncle mediates 
between his brother-in-law and sister and between parents and child, on 
both vertical and horizontal levels. The kinship system establishes as 
meaningful oppositions patrilinear/avunculate. This "primordial law" is, 
according to Lacan, "identical with an order of language" (Lacan, p. 66) 
and superposes the order of culture over that of nature, instituting 
society. The incest taboo regulating mother/son relations is enacted 
through the law of exogamy. 
Exchange — and consequently the rule of exogamy — is not 
simply that of goods exchanged. Exchange — and consequen-
tly the rule of exogamy that expresses it — has in itself a 
social value. It provides the means of binding men together, 
and of superimposing [...] alliance governed by rule [...] [I]t 
provides the fundamental and immutable rule ensuring the 
existence of the group as a group. (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, pp. 
480-481) 
In contrast, to the restricted economy of endogamy which makes 
distinctions within a group, exogamy works towards "greater cohesion" 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 481) by making distinctions between groups. 
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What these laws establish are differential positions within a 
system, a form of identity through difference. Among the binary 
operations instituted are those of self/other, same/different figured in 
the semiotic field of the kinship system as endogamy/exogamy. For 
languages, the complementaries would be framed as native/foreign, 
though with two languages, the permutations of their interrelations are 
more complex (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, pp. 69-70). To conceive of the 
system, the one has to think of the other through the intermediary of a 
third (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 74). It is the concept of reciprocity or 
general exchange which is "the most immediate form of integrating the 
opposition between the self and others" (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 83). For 
reciprocity facilitates the synthesis of two contradictory chains (Lévi-S-
trauss 1969, p. 490). As two types of systems of exchange of signs: 
"exogamy and language [...] have fundamentally the same function — 
communication and integration with others" (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 
493). Indeed, integration is linked to the notion of reciprocity which 
functions in harmonious systems when oppositions will have been 
overcome, a Utopian time that haikens back to a golden age "when the 
confusion of languages made words into common property, the latter 
describing the bliss of the hereafter as a heaven where women will no 
longer be exchanged" (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 497). In Lévi-Strauss's 
account, women have been substituted for words in the venerable vision 
of an Adamic world with a universal language prior to Babel and the 
necessity for translation. Or some future speaking in tongues that would 
transcend the necessity of translation. That words and women be 
exchanged is a requirement of the emergence of symbolic thought as a 
means of "overcoming the contradiction" that woman poses as both 
object of desire, inciting proprietorial instincts, and subject of desire, 
binding others through alliances (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 496). Unlike 
words that are wholly signs, however, woman is both sign and value 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 496). Terms have value for both speaker and 
listener in the exchange (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 61) in the case of 
woman who is both object and subject, both sign and producer of signs, 
caught up in a "split representation" (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p. 61). Both 
within and without representation, woman threatens the system and 
necessitates the solution of exogamy and translation, "the exchange of 
complementary values," in order for circulation, for difference, as the 
fundamental possibility of culture as a social structure to be established. 
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Reconfiguring relations of the social contract 
In introducing woman as sign to solve this contradiction, Lévi-Strauss 
engendered another. While he overlooked it, feminists did not. Indeed, 
its initial critique by Simone de Beauvoir was an important stimulus for 
the orientation of contemporary feminist theory as a theory of differen-
ce, focusing ön the binary oppositions masculine/feminine as they 
construct Woman. Exogamy is characterized by its having woman as 
its unique term of exchange. For this to happen, gendered division 
needed to have always already constituted women as the marked or 
valued term, a pre-given division that is itself social (Cowie, p. 126). 
This presupposed that men were inherently unsocial in their divisive 
desires and needed the exchange of women to institute sociality. In 
contradiction, it also presupposed that the social order is constituted by 
a reciprocal bond between men and men, not by one between men and 
women (de Beauvoir, p. 92). This is the point that Simone de Beauvoir 
emphasizes in her analysis of the history of women's oppression in The 
Second Sex. Little difference does it make whether social relations are 
organized along patrilineal or avuncular lines. Both organize relations 
of filiation. Women's position is the same, mediator not holder of the 
law, excluded from any autonomous relation in her structural situation 
as sign of alterity (de Beauvoir, p. 97). This position is not one of 
reciprocity, de Beauvoir continues, but of "fundamental asymmetry" 
where woman is either "contingent" or the worshipped/feared "Other," 
beyond or above the human realm (de Beauvoir, p. 91). 
Two kinds of alterity are confounded here, so that as absolute 
Other, woman cannot be the other as subject in a relation of reciprocity. 
Indeed there is no reciprocity, no generalized exchange, only restricted 
exchange, under hierarchical relations. This primary sexual division 
inaugurating difference quickly becomes a system of deference. 
Difference is only an illusion, since reciprocal relations are in-different. 
There is no reversible subjectivity between women and men. The 
duality in the collectivity is not complementary, for what are opposed 
in the system are two groups of men. "Society has always been 
masculine, political power has always been in men's hands" (de 
Beauvoir, p. 91). They affirm their transcendence in opposition to 
women situated as Other. The rule of exogamy aids in this domination 
of the powerful archaic Earthmother and the assertion of the human, the 
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social, over the magic (de Beauvoir, p. 96). Mapping Lévi-Strauss' 
model of the social order onto Hegel's account of the reciprocal 
relations of intersubjectivity fixed in oppression by the Master/slave 
dialectic, de Beauvoir concludes that Woman as constructed in the 
kinship system is alienated, contingent, inauthentic. Whereas in other 
power relations there is reciprocity between colonizer and colonized, 
there is no reversibility, no reciprocity, no commutability between 
gendered subject and object (de Beauvoir, p. 18). Borrowing from 
Lévi-Strauss's structuralist theory to consider sexual difference as a 
system of complementary values, de Beauvoir sets out to analyze why 
the passage from Nature to Culture through the formulation of systems 
of oppositions — duality, alternation, opposition, symmetry — has 
produced only fixed, hierarchical difference constructing a singular, 
masculine subject. 
The traffic in women 
It is just this critique of phallocentrism as fixed and restricted, rather 
than a reciprocal or general system of relations of exchange, that 
Irigaray takes up in her exploration of flhom(m)o-sexuality," that is, the 
social bonding between men that is the differentiating moment of social 
exchange which paradoxically takes place through the heterosexual 
distribution of women. This phallogocentric economy depends on an 
economy of reciprocal difference that is never manifest in what is an 
order of in-difference, an order of the same. Offering a critical exegesis 
of how the non-reciprocity between the sexes that is presupposed in the 
exchange between men is inarticulable within that economy, she 
considers what might happen if "the goods get together" ("Les marchan-
dises entre elles") (Irigaray, 1985b). Rather than exploring the 
subjectivities produced when women are forced against their will to 
participate in the violence of the social order founded on a sacrificial 
contract, the killing of the archaic (pre-Oedipal) mother, as Julia 
Kristeva has done, especially in her study of abjection, Irigaray has 
taken up Simone de Beauvoir's concern that the gendered socio-symbo-
lic order produced by exogamy fails to constitute women in the plural 
as a group (de Beauvoir 92). Irigaray's work is an attempt to performa-
tively stage the inarticulate presuppositions and the unnameability of the 
feminine in an alternate economy of relations. 
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This engages the post-structuralist critique of the identitarian 
structures of exchange of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, where the relating 
and unifying movement within a totalizing field of signification 
suppresses the moment of difference, of arbitrariness, through the fixity 
of binary oppositions that confine the ambiguity of linguistic (and 
cultural) signification. Irigaray's project attacks the totalization of the 
neutral, the universal, the in-different, in favour of an active field of 
differential interrelations. As she writes in Sexes et parentés: "Comment 
remodeler les langages existants pour donner lieu a une culture sexuée? 
C'est l'enjeu de mes recherches" (Irigaray, 1987, p. 196). Differences 
are necessary to produce a dynamic field, however, in the present 
situation, she concludes, there is only one gender not two: "Au lieu de 
se reconnaître réellement deux genres et d'accepter une révélation 
venant de l'autre genre — révélation en soi et pour soi —, le peuple des 
hommes prétend détenir toute la vérité et le droit de légiférer en tout: 
philosophie, droit, politique, religion, science [...]" (Irigaray, 1987, p. 
128). Analysis of the social imaginary and the symbolic order is in the 
mode of reproduction of the existing order, not in that of creation, and 
this is the case for all "strategies of reading, translation, interpretation" 
(Irigaray, 1987, p. 101, my translation). The impact of discursive 
structures on meaning is ignored in "discussions about content which 
fail to consider the vehicle of the message" (Irigaray, 1987, p. 183): 
concern is focused on the signified, on similarity and the axis of 
substitution, not on the signifier, and relations of contiguity along the 
axis of combination. 
But to effect permanent and profound changes in these practi-
ces — indeed in "social relations, language, art" — "the economic 
system of exchanges" must be transformed (Irigaray, 1987, p. 96). In 
the current economy, an anal economy, women exchange their children 
for the status of commodity, for value in the marketplace through the 
"maternal function" (Irigaray, 1987, pp. 98-99). Castrated and contained 
by this "libidinal economy," they submit to its "economic, imaginary 
and symbolic organization" (Irigaray, 1987, p. 98). Sexual difference is 
held captive by the Same. In order to transform these relations, so that 
women will no longer be "objects of use and exchange among men," 
will no longer "be rivals on the marketplace," it is necessary to explore 
women's relationships in the plural through the singularity of women's 
love for other women. This would image a different economy of 
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relations through a different organization of desire than the current 
economy of desire between men. There is a difference, Irigaray 
maintains, between the archaic love for the pre-Oedipal mother and love 
for one's sisters. What is needed for this is a symbolic order valorizing 
a heterogeneous economy that allows for bonding between women as 
a group (Irigaray, 1987, p. 32). The "order of the same," an economy 
of "monopoly" (Irigaray, 1985b, pp. 73-74), would be replaced by an 
order of heterogeneity, "an economy of abundance" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 
197). 
That Irigaray has extended her examination of economies of 
exchange to the sacred and monetary systems in her recent work, Sexes 
et parentés (Sex and Kinship), is evidence of the centrality of her 
concern with systems of relations in her critique of the socio-symbolic 
order, whose totality and closure is both presumed and contested in her 
work. Against the containing and immobilizing categories of the current 
symbolic order with its monopolistic claims to totalize all possibilities 
of exchange, she images a generalized exchange that is not conceivable 
within the order of the Same. In so doing, she undermines the totalizing 
claims of the discourse, to expose the Symbolic as "hegemonic" (Butler, 
p. 41). 
How can we speak so as to escape from their compartments, 
their schémas, their distinctions and oppositions: virginal/de-
flowered, pure/impure, innocent/experienced [...] How can we 
shake off the chain of these terms, free ourselves from their 
categories, rid ourselves of their names? Disengage ourselves, 
alive, from their concepts? Without reserve, without the 
immaculate whiteness that shores up their systems. You know 
that we are never completed, but that we only embrace oursel-
ves whole. That one after another, parts — of the body, of 
space, of time — interrupt the flow of our blood. Paralyze, 
petrify, immobilize us. (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 212) 
In this regime of truth, within the logic of truth, of being 
(Irigaray, 1985b, p. 86), a woman is encoded as "awoman," as "an-ar-
chic," "a-teleological", "a body-matter marked by their signifiers, a 
property for their souls-fantasies" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 96). She is the 
place — at once origin and vanishing point — where, paradoxically, 
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"their encoding as speaking subjects is inscribed and where the 'objects' 
of their desire are projected" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 96). "Surplus value" 
has to do with the body of the Other "That is for the Subject, an 
over-pleasure of what instates it as a speaking being" (Irigaray, 198Sb, 
p. 93). Sexual pleasure is situated in the body of the Other and is 
"produced" because the Other exceeds the grasp of discourse (Irigaray, 
1985b, p. 97). But the Other has no other, produces no value, no 
pleasure. Woman is the Phallus, though man has it. This entails a 
paradox, however, one operative in all the discursive systems of the 
order of the Same: female sexualization is produced as a logical 
requirement of this order's binary oppositions and of the existence "of 
a language transcendent with respect to bodies" that is nonetheless 
required to become incarnate "'so to speak*." Woman is constituted as 
a potentially disruptive pre-discursive reality by a language and 
symbolic order that "rules as master" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 89). Within 
this order, all that may be considered is the signified (the meaning) or 
value in the exchange and not the signifier (the vehicle) or process of 
exchange (the production of meaning). 
It is this inability to conceptualize a relation to the instance of 
enunciation of signs and to the tenor of the metaphors of philosophical 
discourse, that is, to conceptualize a relation to the process of produc-
tion of this discourse which consequently seems self-sustaining, 
dis-embodied, that Irigaray deconstructs in Speculum through her 
analysis of the Platonic metaphor of the cave. The focus on the light of 
the transcendent signified, the logos, blinds Plato to the topology of the 
cave itself where the process is taking place in the "antre" (cave), and 
to the implications of the metaphors of birthing he deploys to describe 
the production of the philosopher-ruler who will emerge from the cave 
by a passage — way ("entre") that resembles a birth canal. His 
overlooking this process or passage, of focusing on Being instead of 
Becoming, results in a metaphysics valorizing the one, the same, that 
makes of the "antre" an enclosure instead of a process ("entre"). The 
"enceinte" functions as a containing wall rather than as a womb-like 
space of creation and transformation. It is a system of reproduction, 
repetition, of likeness, of the "propre" — logocentrism — not a system 
of interrelations. Phallocentrism too operates in the logic of the Same 
in what Irigaray exposes as an a priori contradicting the very system it 
subtends. This economy and ideology of reproduction values the 
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maternal function over the erotic: mother-daughter relations are 
conceived in terms of masculine desire and homosexuality (Irigaray, 
1985a, p. 63), that is within the inscription of "property," to submit to 
the name (law) of the father. 
Enveloped in proper skins, but not our own. Withdrawn into 
proper names, violated by them. Not yours, not mine. We 
don't have any. We change names as men exchange us, as 
they use us, use us up. It would be frivolous of us, exchanged 
by them, to be so changeable. (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 205) 
In this probing of the logical paradoxes on which this system 
of the Same is (un)founded, Irigaray strategically performs the mobility 
and difference that this order of the same cannot represent. She exposes 
the instability of the system of property established to keep woman in 
her proper place as an object of exchange. But this very exchangeabili-
ty of the sign introduces considerations of indeterminacy and contingen-
cy that undermine the totalizing claims of this phallic economy, this 
order in which the masculine has a monopoly on the same, a monopoly 
on value (Irigaray 1985b, p. 73). As her deconstructive probing of the 
metaphors of this economy enacts, sameness, unity, the phallus, involve 
giving an "a priori value to Sameness," the category that is at once the 
centre of this system and what is excluded from its reflection or 
representation. Resorting to "time-honoured devices such as analogy, 
comparison, symmetry, dichotomous oppositions," the system remains 
emprisoned in a "certain economy of the logos" that produces in-diffe-
rence. Despite this, as Irigaray shows, the "enceinte" is broken open — 
the categories that aim to fix and contain difference are mined by 
anoriginal différance. By stressing the overdetermination, the logical 
contradiction, the polysemy, the deferred meaning, the repetition 
compulsion, the death drive, in this system, Irigaray makes manifest the 
presuppositions of the scene of representation, the "indifference that 
subtends it assuring] its coherence and its closure" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 
72). In-difference, it is both the same, likeness, but only as difference: 
this radical indeterminacy precludes any identity. Yet another paradox. 
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Contamination 
The "interpretive lever" Irigaray introduces into this scene for its 
unfolding is a strategy of "interpretive re-reading," reading not to 
produce "symbolic, point-by-point interpretation of philosophers' 
utterances," but instead to examine "the operation of the 'grammar* of 
each figure of discourse, its syntactic laws or requirements, its 
imaginary configurations, its metaphoric networks," and also to probe 
"its silences" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 75). It is a reading not for meaning 
but to unfold the processes of meaning making, to follow along the 
chains of signifiers to locate the overdeterminations operative in their 
combinations. Repeating the philosophers' utterances, it is a reading 
with (and against) the text. Touching on. Living on. 
This engages in another economy of sign manipulation, not that 
of the proper, but of the (im)proper, of contamination. An economy not 
of penury, of usure, but of "abundance." Not of containment but of 
discharge, where one thing flows into another, touches upon another. 
And don't worry about the 'right* word. There isn't any. No 
truth between our lips. There is room enough for everything 
to exist. Everything is worth exchanging, nothing is privile-
ged, nothing is refused. Exchange? Everything is exchanged, 
yet there are no transactions. Between us, there are no 
proprietors, no purchasers, no determinable objects, no prices. 
Our bodies are nourished by our mutual pleasure. Our 
abundance is inexhaustible: it knows neither want nor plenty. 
Since we give each other (our) all, with nothing held back, 
nothing hoarded, our exchanges are without terms, without end. 
How can I say it? The language we know is so limited... 
You are moving. You never stay still. You never stay. You 
never 'are.' How can I say 'you,* when you are always other? 
How can I speak to you? You remain in flux, never congealing 
or solidifying. What will make that current flow into words? 
It is multiple, devoid of causes, meanings, simple qualities. 
Yet it cannot be decomposed. These movements cannot be 
described as the passage from a beginning to an end. These 
rivers flow into no single, definitive sea [...] This unceasing 
mobility. (Irigaray, 1985b, pp. 214-215) 
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Through the strategic use of metonymy figuring a provisional 
counter-discourse, through questions, the scrambling of deixis (We — 
you/I), Irigaray configures a discourse that flows through the grids and 
closures of the discourse of the Same, exceeding its grasp. This is a 
discourse of women to women, beyond that regulated by the "signs of 
possession" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 211), one that simulates the pleasure of 
women touching each other, touching on, living on. ("When I touch 
myself, I touch you at a distance"). This is a "dialect of relation" not 
sexualized only by the phallic function, that is, the maternal function as 
the signifier of the desire of the Other (Irigaray, 1985a, 1985b, p. 62). 
Nonetheless, though this culture makes of women "a medium of 
exchange, with very little profit to them" except in the power of slaves, 
this is not a discourse that simply reverses the relation of mastery, but 
one that deconstructs the very concept of mastery and identity, of 
totality and closure, emerging from the decentred subjectivity of one 
who is always contradictory and multiple, as an exploration of 
heterogeneous "auto-eroticism" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 32). 
Hers are contradictory words, somewhat mad from the 
standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever listens to them 
with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in hand. 
For in what she says, too, at least when she dares, woman is 
constantly touching herself [...] For if "she" says something, it 
is not, it is no longer, identical with what she means. What 
she says is never identical with anything, moreover; rather, it 
is contiguous. It touches (upon). And when it strays too far 
from that proximity, she breaks off and starts over at "zero" 
[...] (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 29) 
This is not conservation through the reproduction of self, of meaning. 
On the contrary, the woman aims to get rid of words so as not to 
become fixed or congealed in them. It is a loss of meaning that cannot 
be called negativity in the philosophical order, but is a non-sense that 
is beyond the closure or horizon of absolute knowledge, beyond the 
alternatives of symmetry or opposition, outside the closure of metaphy-
sics as non-value, exceeding the logos in thinking the unthinkable (the 
lesbian couple). The "parole blanche" of a general economy of 
writing, it might be called, in Derrida's words: "a sort of potlatch of 
signs." (Derrida, 1967, p. 403). This is to participate in an economy of 
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expenditure without reserve, exceeding the law, an economy of the gift 
whose contract entails a ritual of sacrifice (Mauss, p. 13), of usure. 
The goods get together 
What is at stake for Irigaray is a different economy, one that "upsets the 
linearity of a project, undermines the goal-object of a desire, diffuses 
the polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts fidelity to a single 
discourse..." (In)fidelity — the excess or waste of a "mirror invested 
by the masculine 'subject' to reflect himself, to copy himself in 
"specula(riza)tion" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 30). This imaginary, staged as 
hypothetical figuration of a feminine libidinal economy organized 
otherwise around the endless circulation of desire, of signs, is articula-
ted "behind the screen of representation," outside the reach of screen 
memories of a primal Oedipal scenario, in the repetition of a repetition 
of Souter's version of Alice through the Looking Glass. This is the 
order of the recursive paradigm, of the anamorphic distorting mirror. 
Like the Speculum, it refuses to send back a copy in reverse, but 
scatters and disperses the light rays, producing a different image, an 
image of différance. In its framing, Irigaray's meditation on "This Sex 
Which is Not One" — not an identity or an entity, but a moveable site 
("'She' is indefinitely other in herself," Irigaray, 1985b, p. 28) — plays 
out indeterminacy, shifting between plurality and lack. The paradox of 
deferred meaning can only be performed, not described. The text enacts 
the topological logic it discerns, eschewing "ownership and property," 
but not nearness. Topological relations of proximity organize an 
economy that refuses fixity and identity: "Nearness so pronounced that 
it makes all discrimination of identity, and thus all forms of property, 
impossible." This disrupts all prevailing economies, especially that in 
which woman has been a "use-value for man, an exchange value among 
men" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 31). The "commodity" is not a commodity, 
not an entity, but a process and, as such, slips through the "competition 
for possession" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 32). This would bring an end to the 
"traffic in women" since they are no longer commodities in that they 
refuse to go to market. 
The disruption produced by the "commodities among themsel-
ves" (or "the goods getting together") brings to a crisis the aporia on 
which the social contract has been figured, namely its sexual in-diffe-
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rence. The focus on exogamy as the rite of passage from Nature to 
Culture has served "as an alibi for the smooth working of man's 
relations with himself," that is, for endogamy. "Sociocultural endoga-
my" excludes the participation of woman, the other, for women are 
forbidden commerce with other women. "The use and traffic in women 
subtend and uphold the reign of masculine hom(m)o-sexuality, even 
while they maintain that hom(m)o-sexuality in speculation, mirror 
games, identifications, and more or less rivalrous appropriations, which 
defer its real practice" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 172). Men make commerce 
of not with women, for the economic relations in place require women 
to alienate themselves in exchanges in which they do not take part and 
exempt men from being circulated as commodities. Irigaray's re-writing 
exposes the conflation of sign and symbol, destabilizing the claims to 
purity of the discourse of the same. The commodities among themselves 
are neither equal, nor alike, nor different, for they have relation only in 
the desire of the subject whose narcissism endows the commodities with 
value. But this is, as Irigaray writes, to add a plus value or "supple-
ment" to the commodity, a supplement found in another commodity, 
whose use value then becomes the standard value (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 
177). Women-as-commodities are divided within themselves into 
use-value and plus or exchange value, into matter-body and the precious 
supplement that is ungraspable by themselves. This is a division into 
private and social use (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 176). Probing here the "split 
representation" of woman within and without representation, the 
contradiction Lévi-Strauss attempted to resolve with the theory of the 
traffic in women, Irigaray on the contrary exposes it as an a priori 
necessity of a phallic economy. In that the labour force expended in the 
production of an object is abstracted in the process of universalization 
that is the operation of social exchanges, women's role is as "fetish-ob-
jects" in respect to the Phallus which they represent, rather than have 
(Irigaray, 1985b, p. 183). "Naturally," women remain amorphous: 
socially they are produced by the phallic economy as "mother, virgin, 
prostitute" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 186). In this, man appropriates the 
reproductive capacity of woman "marked with the name of the father" 
and "engenders himself as a man, born into "human," "supernatural" 
existence. The resulting social system, as Irigaray writes, "can be 
interpreted as the practical realization of the meta-physical" (Irigaray, 
1985b, p. 189), an idealized order that disregards the contingencies of 
the sign materialized in an instance of enunciation. It is an order of 
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phallogocentrism that exalts the Phallus as "Woman" but distances it 
from any connection to the penis. 
When the "goods get together," they "short-circuit the 
mechanisms of commerce" and "expose what is really at stake" by 
"lowering the sublime value of the standard," that is, unmasking the 
power of the phallus by showing the penis to be merely a means to 
pleasure among men (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 193). The penis is introduced 
in a deflationary gesture to expose the overdeterminations of the 
metaphor, destabilizing the distinctions between "figurative" and "literal" 
meaning on which phallocentrism is founded. This brings to a crisis the 
illusions, the representations, that have functioned as screens "pretense 
or sham" for a system that hides "its own endogamies" (Irigaray, 1985b, 
p. 192). The word signifies beyond itself, bearing within it the 
contradictions marking a tradition: exogamy (of Lévi-Strauss's sort) is 
not really exogamy but endogamy. The very order of heterosexuality 
requires homosexuality as its organizing principle. Yet, such relations 
among men can take place only on the symbolic level: to display 
pédérastie love would bring the symbolic system of monogamous 
reproduction to an end by destabilizing its instituting categories. 
Exchanges and relationships among men are thus paradoxically both 
"required and forbidden by law" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 193). 
Feminine homosexuality cannot be accounted for in this 
system, for as soon as a woman desires herself, speaks to/for herself, 
she is a man. Any relationship with another woman is a homosexual, 
and consequently masculine, one by virtue of the "masculinity complex" 
(Irigaray, 1985b, p. 194). Female homosexuality can only be configured 
by masculine desire in the order of the same through the Phallus. There 
is no place in the symbolic order to figure the relations of mother/-
daughter. This is the "blind spot of an old dream of symmetry" 
(Irigaray, 1985a, p. 11). There are no reciprocal relations here: only 
one kind of endogamy can be sustained. Yet this is done through a 
metaphor wherein endogamy presents itself as difference, as exogamy. 
If the goods refuse to go to market, however, attempt to maintain a 
"commerce among themselves," they undermine the logic of identity by 
bringing to a crisis the contradiction between use-value and exchange-
value in the restricted economy. Foregrounding the blurring of 
Phallus/penis, they would expose the metaphor that is not a metaphor 
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but a metonymy. In this gesture of interruption and dis/placement, they 
enact an order of exchange not ruled by the either/or of binary 
oppositions, but by the and/and of contiguous chains. 
Exchanges without identifiable terms, without accounts, 
without end... Without additions and accumulations, one plus 
one, woman after woman... Without sequence or number. 
Without standard or yardstick. Red blood and sham would no 
longer be differentiated by deceptive envelopes concealing their 
worth. Use and exchange would be indistinguishable. The 
greatest value would be at the same time the least kept in 
reserve. Nature's resources would be expended without 
depletion, exchanged without labor, freely given, exempt from 
masculine transactions: enjoyment without a fee, well-being 
without pain, pleasure without possession. As for all the 
strategies and savings, the appropriations tantamount to theft 
and rape, the laborious accumulation of capital, how ironic all 
that would be. (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 197) 
This Utopian fiction is figured as an economy of excess which 
undermines the economy of the same that has maintained incest in the 
realm of pretense, as a necessary fiction. 
In developing this model of an alternative economy of signifi-
cation, Irigaray, does not collapse the feminine into the female in order 
to undermine stable binary sex oppositions between men and women 
with a theory of bi-sexuality as Hélène Cixous has done (Binhammer, 
p. 77). Rather, the collapsing of the distinction between phallus/penis 
under the either/or logic of the same, works to displace oppositional 
thinking by associative thinking that works with the contingent, so that 
though never fixed, there is nonetheless a connection between the 
masculine and the male and between the feminine and the female. 
Asking the question "What is woman?" leads only to the answer "lack" 
or "imitation." The feminine signifies possibly as "disruptive excess" 
(Irigaray, 1985b, p. 78). To approach the feminine as a style that is not 
a style, is to explore a way of looking at things that does not privilege 
sight, distinctions, but the "tactile" which puts things back in touch with 
themselves without constituting any unity. Desiring "the proximate," 
rather than "(the) property," its motifs of "self-touching" and "proximi-
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ty" cannot "appropriate the feminine for discourse." This way of 
working with words involves "simultaneity" — "its proper aspect" that 
is never fixed in the "identity-of-self of some form." It is "fluid," 
exhibiting those characteristics of fluids that create dynamics, "those 
rubbings between two infinitely near neighbours" (Irigaray 1985b, 79). 
Not the loss of erasure, but the excess of touching on. 
An economy of fluids 
Fluidity is connected to female bodies metonymically in "When Our 
Lips Speak Together," ("We know the contours of our bodies well 
enough to love fluidity"; Irigaray, 1985b, p. 215) in what Jane Gallop 
has called Irigaray's "vulvomorphic" display (Gallop, p. 96). Fluidity 
is what is most taboo in the exchange between men, as is demonstrated 
in Irigaray's parodie rewriting of de Sade, "'Françaises', ne faites plus 
un effort..." How to figure the "real" female body in the pornographic 
paradigm? For the libertine, flouting all prohibitions, "menstrual blood 
generally remains taboo. Excrement may be all right, but menstrual 
flow, no..." (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 200). Fluidity may be a motif 
irreducible to any centring, but its connections to the female body stage 
a reverse collapsing of boundaries. Can the literal be divorced from the 
figurative? Is it possible to empty out all meaning from feminine that 
relates to the referent of female bodies? Irigaray suggests the impossi-
bility of such binary oppositions in her description of the work on 
language that must be undertaken to décentre the masculine from its 
totalizing claims, so that "the masculine would no longer be 'every-
thing'" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 80). What must be disrupted is the 
"teleological effect" that makes "linear reading" possible and supports 
common sense understandings of unary processes. In a process of 
constant "redoubling," continuous reversal, every separation, including 
that between the instance of enunciation and the utterance would be 
turned topsy-turvy. Binary "recto-verso" structures would be displaced 
should the retroactive impact of the ordering of sentences on the 
beginning of an utterance be taken into consideration. In such a logic, 
it is impossible to separate the female from the feminine, the literal 
from the figurative, for they are constantly touching and retouching 
upon each other "in the supplementarity of this reversal" (Irigaray, 
1985b, p. 80). 
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In this, the "opposition between structures of horizontality and 
verticality" at work in language is also displaced so that the vertical 
collapses into the horizontal. No longer is it possible to separate the 
operations of substitution, carried out along the paradigmatic axis of the 
system, from those of combination carried out along the syntagmatic 
chain. The relations of signifier to signified in the first are mixed up 
with the combination of signifiers and the particularities of the speech 
act in the second. What Irigaray displaces here is the binary opposition 
of the two systems of relation established by Roman Jakobson, when 
he linked them to the operations of figurative language by relating the 
faculty of selection and substitution to metaphor and that of continguity 
and combination to metonymy. The binary opposition of the two tropes 
is also supported by Jacques Lacan who, in "The Agency of the Letter 
in the Unconscious," reworks Jakobson's distinction in psychoanalytic 
terms, so that the field of metaphor corresponds to the Freudian concept 
of condensation while metonymy is connected with displacement. 
Lacan develops an algorithm for metaphor where the + sign, placed 
between S(+)s, manifests the crossing of the bar dividing the signifier 
from the signified, to produce a signification effect which is of creation 
(Lacan, p. 274). Irigaray critiques the phallocentrism of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, underlining the tendency of metaphor to rigidify the 
slippage of signifiers, through an analysis of the work of metonymy in 
an essay on "The 'Mechanics' of Fluids." This critique of the discour-
ses of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and their construction of gender, 
centres on their shared modalities of exchange and signification. 
Through metaphor, it will lead us back to the (im)possibility of 
translation. 
What is at stake in this essay is the need for the "liberation of 
women" which necessitates a transformation of the economy through a 
change in culture and language. Entailed in this change in economies 
is a shift in the "ruling symbolics" from a "mechanics of solids alone" 
to an "economy of fluids" (Irigaray, 1985b, pp. 105-107). Noting the 
long-standing "complicity" between rationality and a mechanics of 
solids, Irigaray interrogates logical rules such as the principle of 
equivalence which holds that whatever is non-identical to itself is a 
contradictory concept and the focus of Lacanian psychoanalysis on "Ie 
petit objet a." What, she asks, is there in the structuration of (the) 
language that has maintained a focus on the "definition of terms" 
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instead of on "the analysis of relations among terms" (Irigaray, 1985b, 
p. 107)? Why has there been a focus on relations of signifier/signified 
to fix a singular meaning rather than on relations among signifiers to 
explore the overdeterminations that produce meaning? The ruling mode 
of symbolization, having excluded the properties of fluids, has "privile-
ge^] metaphor (a quasi solid) over metonymy (which much more 
closely allied to fluids" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 108). In psychoanalysis, this 
has resulted in the "object of desire" being "the transformation of fluid 
to solid" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 111) and the consequent privileging of the 
phallus. In logic, a preponderant role is left to "the symbol of 
universality" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 106) which, privileging the principle 
of equivalence and analogy over paradox and combination, excludes the 
possibility of there being several contradictory systems modulating the 
order of truths. Interrelations among concepts are subsumed by the all 
which is the extension of the concepts. The not-all, "God or feminine 
pleasure" is the "geometric prop," the "copulative link" — "awoman" 
(Irigaray, 1985b, pp. 106-107). But this copula in the logic of Being 
has been appropriated in advance for a project of formalization, 
mathematization or idealization. 
"An adjustment of meaning," a parallax, is required for analysis 
of the properties of fluids. From the perspective of the economy of 
solids, of the proper, woman is unrepresentable, lack or excess. In 
discourse, she does not exist: "And yet the woman-thing speaks. But not 
'like,' not 'the same/ not 'identical with itself nor to any x, etc. Not 
a 'subject/ unless transformed by phallocratism. It speaks 'fluid/ even 
in paralytic undersides of that economy." (Irigaray, 1985b, p. I l l ) 
Situated in the dynamics of the near, in resistance to the countable, she 
is easily traversed by flow, mixing and diluting with bodies in like state: 
"What she emits is flowing, fluctuating, Blurring. And she is not 
listened to, unless proper meaning (meaning òf the proper) is lost" 
(Irigaray, 1985b, p. 112). 
The flow is frozen and congealed by rationality since the fluid 
"is by nature, unstable" like the "inside/outside of philosophical 
discourse" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 112), an instability or indeterminacy that 
invades language too, against which the geometrism of the order of 
solids defends by denying the metaphoricity of all language and by 
constructing binary oppositions between metaphor and metonymy. This 
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is a binary that Irigaray destabilizes in the logic of paradox that is the 
logic of metonymy. It is impossible to step outside the symbolic order: 
one is caught up in the metaphoricity of language. But the question of 
inside/outside is itself an unstable relation, grounded in the binary logic 
of the same. Within the logic of abundance (of the parergon or frame), 
they perform as relational terms producing their opposites since they are 
mutually constitutive, touching on each other. In addressing the status 
of philosophical discourse and exposing the fictive and provisional 
nature of its truths in order to explore the possibilities for a logic of 
becoming, Irigaray restages an argument of Derrida's — with a 
difference, that of deliberately assumed mimicry. 
Metonymy in the text of philosophy 
"Metaphor in the text of philosophy" (Derrida, 1982, p. 209) is a major 
issue in contemporary French philosophy. In "White Mythologies," 
Derrida probes the slippage of boundaries between "natural language" 
and "philosophical" language through the status of metaphor in 
philosophical discourse. In the tradition of metaphysics, there is an 
attempt to divorce truth from metaphor. Derrida argues that while 
philosophical discourse asserts a truth outside metaphor, and attempts 
to resist any contamination of figurative language, it cannot do so: 
philosophy can never escape metaphor. Metaphor promises more than 
it gives and so functions as a performative. In terms of truth, however, 
it is not profitable, it leads to a loss. What interests him is the "usure of 
metaphorical force in philosophical interchange" (Derrida, 1982, p. 209). 
Usure constitutes the very history and structure of the philosophical 
metaphor: "it will never make a profit" because even if one sought to 
circumscribe all metaphors in philosophy, "one metaphor, at least, 
always would remain excluded, outside the system [...] the metaphor of 
metaphor" (Derrida, 1982, pp. 219-220). The concept of metaphor is 
thus inscribed in the general economy of writing, an economy which, 
according to Derrida, is the one that shows how metaphysics's eternal 
attempt to profit from its ventures is based upon an "expenditure 
without reserve" without which there could be no idea of profit 
(Derrida, 1982, p. 209). 
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Usure, as he comments, has a double import, both the supple-
mentary product of a capital, the surplus valued from linguistic 
exchange — a self-cancelling term — and erasure by rubbing. 
Metaphor too is double, that which simultaneously hides and is hidden, 
an "original figure" that both effaces itself and is ef-faced (Derrida, 
1982, p. 211). A kind of "transparent figure," equivalent to a literal 
meaning, becomes metaphorical when philosophical discourse puts it 
into circulation. The first meaning and the first displacement are 
simultaneously forgotten, the metaphor is no longer noticed and is taken 
for the proper meaning. Philosophy, Derrida asserts," "would be this 
process of metaphorization" (Derrida, 1982, p. 211). This "unlimited 
[linguistic] surplus-value," the absolute usure of the sign" is not an issue 
with the metaphysician: the "fabulous" scene of the production of the 
metaphor has been erased, though it remains "as white ink," active if 
invisible under a palimpsest. 
Metaphor has traditionally been defined as a trope of resem-
blance, not just as resemblance between a signifier and signified, but 
also the resemblance between signs, one of which represents the other. 
Derrida sets out to show that it is also a trope of difference. Stress on 
the analogical powers of metaphor develops from a concern with 
"semantic depth" and an attention to the vertical axis of subordination, 
rather than as he proposes, to the "positional combinations" along the 
"métonymie axis," that is to the value of the term as determined by its 
environment. A project in metaphorics is an (im)possibility, Derrida 
writes, in light of the dissemination of the "fantasmagorie" sun in 
Mallarmé's texts which disrupt the oppositions of literal [propre] and 
figurative, metaphor and metonymy, figure and ground, syntax and 
semantics. Philosophy, though, can perceive its metaphorics "only 
around a blind spot," unable to grasp the metaphor of metaphors 
because of the fundamental oppositions of sensible/intelligible, 
signifier/signified that have been constituted as the history of philosophy 
by topological movements no longer perceived as metaphors, functio-
ning as catachresis (Derrida, 1982, p. 229). Philosophical discourse is 
constituted by metaphorics in a system of interpretation that links 
metaphor, mimesis, logos, physis, phone, semainein, onoma (Derrida, 
1982, p. 232). Attempting to restore movement to the chain of 
signification, Derrida rereads the treatises on rhetoric, rereads Aristotle's 
Poetics to situate metaphor within the formulation of the concept of 
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mimesis. For Aristotle, "to produce a good metaphor is to see a 
likeness" (1459 a 7-8). The condition for a good metaphor is thus the 
condition for truth. Mimesis is considered to belong to logos. In 
contrast, according to Aristotle, is the animal aping or "gesticular 
mimicry" of the unthinking beast. In this very definition of mimesis as 
that which is the privileged action of man, the physical impinges as the 
very "naturalness" of the movement that "constrains mimesis" in its 
redoubling (Derrida, 1982, p. 237). 
The contamination of the metaphysical by the physical through 
the work of a metaphor that is not perceived as a metaphor is what 
Luce Irigaray disseminates in Plato's analysis of mimesis and truth in 
the metaphor of the sun and the cave. For her too, the issue is philoso-
phy's relation to language and the impossibility of divorcing the 
figurative from the literal or truth from metaphor, that is truth from 
fiction or interpretation. However, she has another project in this 
critique of metaphysics, one focused on the question of gender. Unlike 
Derrida, she is not preeminently concerned with the metaphor of the 
sun, but rather with that of the ground from which the sun is viewed, 
the metaphors of location that situate the viewer within a specific site 
determinant of the semantic depth of his encounter with the sun of truth. 
Pursuing this politics of location, Irigaray demonstrates that the 
metaphors in play are gendered metaphors. The economy of usure is 
at work in Plato's metaphor: while he argues against metaphor as a bad 
copy of the Ideal, the mode of his argument consists, itself, of meta-
phors, specifically of the metaphor of the cave/womb/woman. Irigaray 
does not follow up Derrida's line of argumentation to pursue the 
question of the difference between good and bad metaphors, as they 
function in science, though she deploys this analysis in her own strategy 
of interpretive rereading. While dead metaphors or catachresis are bad 
metaphors, those that form the presupposition of arguments, a 
"nonmediate, constructed metaphor, is useful when it comes to 
'illustrate' knowledge wrested from bad metaphors." Its value is 
"blanching" (Derrida, 1982, p. 259). A self-reflexive use of metaphor 
that deploys metonymy strategically working out the exchange between 
tenor and vehicle so as to foreground the work of the vehicle is what 
Irigaray enacts in her "vulvomorphic" connections "when our lips speak 
together" (Irigaray, 1985b). This self-reflexive troping that foregrounds 
the fictiveness of its strategies performs its own work of deconstructing 
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the unstable boundaries between truth and interpretation and, as Irigaray 
makes clear, develops site specific metaphors contingent on the gender 
of the fabular philosopher to show that the Phallus connects to a penis. 
However, she also disrupts the metaphoric forces of the cave/womb/wo-
man equation by destabilizing its fixity through the polysémie play on 
"antre" (cave)/"entre" (between) to foreground the philosopher's cave as 
a place of passage, a site of transformation and becoming, not the 
ground of being. 
In developing such a site specific or contingent theory of value, 
Irigaray foregrounds the issue of mimesis and mimicry in Plato's work. 
The metaphors she deploys are not metaphors but metonymies, flowing, 
fluid, running together. The métonymie field is that organized by 
relations of contiguity and combination, not of similarity and substitu-
tion. Consequently, it escapes from the either/or formulation that 
separates tenor and vehicle, intelligible and sensible, form and matter, 
signs and bodies. It is no longer possible to read the relation of 
feminine to female, of woman to women literally — biologistically — 
or metaphorically as having no connection to women. Rather the literal 
and the figurative run into each other, contaminating each other. The 
value of the terms is determined by their environment, metonymically 
considered in relation to what touches them. Following up the 
signifying chain from metonymy to metonymy leads one from the 
"fluid," from the female/feminine to the issue of reproduction to 
mimesis. 
the ebb and flow of our lives spent in the exhausting labor of 
copying, miming. Dedicated to reproducing — that sameness 
in which we have remained for centuries, as the other. (Iriga-
ray, 1985b, p. 207) 
Mimetism as production, a heterogeneous logic of becoming, displaces 
mimesis or the reproduction of the proper. As Irigaray phrases this, the 
place of the feminine in the symbolic order, the only one assigned her, 
is that of "mimicry" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 76). The feminine, then, is a 
role that must be "assumed deliberately." This is the "gesticular 
mimicry" or animal aping of the anti-logos productive of bad metaphor, 
according to Aristotle. "To play with mimesis is thus for a woman to 
try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse without 
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allowing herself to be reduced to it." This already changes a form of 
subordination into affirmation and challenges the binary idea/matter, 
tenor/vehicle, literal/figurai, crucial to mimetic theory. Through this 
"playful repetition," through this performance of the feminine, taking 
femininity (in)fidelity, what was supposed to remain invisible — the 
work of troping — is exposed. Simultaneously, that women are such 
good "mimics," "unveils" the fact that they are not completely caught 
up in this function, but also "remain elsewhere" (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 76). 
Femininity is consequently a provisional performance, not an essence. 
In developing such a theory of value based on change, on the 
metonymical trait of language and the constant slippage and rubbing of 
signifier on signifier at a loss, rather than on symbolic value of 
exchange, Irigaray foregrounds the problem of mimesis and mimicry in 
Plato's work. Through her exploration of the metaphor of the cave 
through which Plato develops his theory of ideas and the inadequacy of 
any material reproduction of them, Irigaray shows how Plato's argument 
is contaminated by mimesis technè, material mimesis or reproduction 
that produces distortion, and fails to maintain the binary opposition 
between intelligible (mathematical and logical relations) and sensory 
mimesis, philosophy and rhetoric (art), original and copy, metaphor and 
metonymy, his argument had set out. Consequently, the distinction 
between mimesis and mimicry is undermined when they run into each 
other. Promising more than it gives, philosophy is a performative. 
Gender and translation participate in this economy of contamination, 
unable to maintain a separation of same and different, original and 
copy. This is the turning of the troping of metonymy... the mimetism of 
ludic repetition or supplement that exposes the operations of representa-
tion as the production of value within an economy of meaning 
configured by a specific set of overlapping signifiers. The métonymie 
infiltrating the metaphoric making (im)possible philosophy/theory, 
translation and gender. Instead of an exchange of signs constituting the 
identity of differing groups, there is only the change of signs in a 
combinatory of provisional groupings that announces the reign of the 
signifier. Reading from one signifier to another, connecting one 
signifier with another... Translating with the signifier, as it is contami-
nated by another while past and future configurations commingle, 
thickening the web of relations... The possibilities for expanding 
meaning overflow, excessive, limited temporarily only by the pragmatic 
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contingencies of the specific instance of utterance. The utterance. 
Irigaray's critique of systems of exchange articulates the necessity of 
pragmatics. It matters who is speaking to whom and under what 
conditions. 
What is at stake here is a shift from a relationship between 
interpretation and the object of interpretation to a concern with the 
implications of that particular interpretation. This engages a shift from 
an axiological to an ethical theory and practice of translation, which 
investigates the environment of a given performance. 
Metonymy in the text of translation or: 
Traducing by lapse and bounds 
Traducing by "lapse and bounds" (Cixous, 1986, p. 96). Translating by 
lack or excess. In conclusion, I want briefly to take up this question of 
an ethics of translation to investigate the effects of a performance 
through the "interpretive lever" introduced by Irigaray, of a rereading 
to examine the operations of figures of discourse, the imaginary 
configurations and metaphoric networks of a specific praxis. What 
happens to the network of "antre"/"entre" when it is transformed from 
French to English? A shift from a regime of heterogeneity to enter a 
regime of analogy — this is the story of the translation of Irigaray's 
Speculum de Vautre femme. In contrast, is the story of the translation 
of Cixous's Vivre l'orange, her first published version of a "reading 
with Clarice Lispector" where reading is a complex process of interlin-
gual translation among several languages. The book is produced 
bilingually, with French and English texts facing each other. Puns, 
multilingual polysémie word plays, proliferate across languages, setting 
in play a chain of signifiers that produces an inter-language moving 
between English, French, Portuguese in a textual contamination, 
transformation. What these two translations enact are some pf the 
possible strategies of handling metonymy in the text of translation. 
Briefly, in what follows, I want to examine the strategies used for 
translating the word play in the texts of these two French feminist 
theorists, for the punning, as I have shown, both introduces the key 
"metaphors" of their theoretical systems and deploys the strategy of 
self-reflexive mimicry. This foregrounding of the métonymie occurs 
through the slippage of meaning along the chain of combination as 
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signifier connects with signifier, sliding across the bar of the signified, 
in a (dis)play of laughter (wit) that reorganizes the economy of the 
logos (Lacan 266). 
There are other strategies of rereading that would explore the 
contingencies of the discursive fields of French and English feminism 
on these translations; examine the processes of translation through 
analysis of the characteristic strategies of translators in translating for 
the letter or for the meaning as exhibited in their other translations, or 
through the specific choices effected during translation as revealed in 
a narrative account of the process. What all these approaches share is 
a concern for attention to the production of meaning in translation rather 
than for a re-covery of meaning or an evaluation of the truthfulness of 
"copy" to "original." In this, they address attention to the translator-ef-
fect, that is to the translator as the place at which the process of infinite 
semiosis is halted within an utterance that works to produce political 
effects. The focus is on who the translator is, for whom the translation 
is being produced, under what conditions the translation is being 
constructed. This raises questions about the imbrication of power and 
truth. Who gets to fix or determine the relations between signifiers and 
signified that produce signification or truth (i.e. convention) in a 
particular discursive instance? These engage questions of the literary 
institution, the structure of desire in the transferential relation between 
subject and object of translation (Godard, 1989), the production of 
translators, the self-reflexivity of the translation process (Godard, 1986, 
1990), the démystification of translation as a transformative process of 
production of meaning (Godard, 1991). 
To fully articulate the translator-effect as it is operative in the 
translation of texts by Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous would require 
an analysis of the polysystems of French and American literary 
institutions, especially the articulation of feminist discourses within 
these systems and the translation norms at work (Godard, 1987). Such 
transference mechanisms constrain the selection and manipulation of 
feminist texts in their movement from one language system to another. 
Generally, in this instance of translation into a non-canonical system, 
the texts entering the feminist system use the behaviour patterns and 
models prominent in the canonized system of the target language with 
the effect of turning the different into the same. The work of transla-
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tion is hidden in a theory of language and translation that assumes the 
transparency of the signifier. This is most evident in the translations of 
texts by Luce Irigaray, published by American university presses. 
However, the first translated work by Hélène Cixous was published by 
the French press, des femmes, directed at an anglophone readership 
within the circumference of the French literary institution. That this 
translation was a collaborative venture with Cixous aided by two 
anglophones amplifies the differences between the two practices: vivre 
l'orange is an instance of self-translation, rather than translation of work 
by another, and so belongs to a different mode of rewriting as the 
repetition of a process rather than the repetition of a product. Because 
of its position within the French feminist discursive system, the 
translation of vivre l'orange had little impact on the norms of translation 
for other French feminist texts, though it established a model for 
translation of Cixous's work into English. Translations of Irigaray's 
work on the contrary attracted considerable attention from American 
feminists. However, they discussed the texts as though written in 
English and not subjected to the transformative process of translation. 
The translation in question adopted a strategy other than that generated 
by the métonymie theory of exchange articulated by Irigaray: it muted 
the métonymie displacements, reading the text as unary discourse not 
as transformative signifying practice. The reception of this discourse by 
American feminists compounded the effect of the in-different translation 
practice, accusing Irigaray of essentialism (Jones, p. 367), reading the 
body in a network of biological signifiers rather than as discursive 
construction deliberately assumed in order to expose the métonymie 
contingencies of gender operative in the texts of theory. The narrative 
of the franco-american disconnection can be read elsewhere (Godard, 
1987). It is a problem in discourse where conflicting discursive 
configurations of meaning have poliferated as an effect of translation. 
A major difference between the two translation practices is 
situated in the relative attention given to the signifier. Translation for 
meaning differs from translating to the letter. Briefly, I want to 
illustrate the implications of these questions in respect to the translation 
of polysemy. As I have suggested, the slippage of the signifier is 
crucial to the way Irigaray stages her argument as well as in articulating 
the issues at stake in this argument In Gillian Gill's translation of 
Speculum, polysemy is not-translated, nor is a compensatory system of 
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explication of the choices established. The complex of terms which in 
French articulate overlapping networks around the concepts of similari-
ty, identity, subjectivity, literal meaning, property, propriety or the law, 
are fixed in singular English terms that break their connecting métony-
mie chains of signifiers. So "non-propre" (Irigaray, 1974, p. 274) is 
translated as "non-propertied" (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 291). Possession, 
ownership, is stressed here, and the other possible significations of 
non-literal or figurative, contamination, improper or against the law, are 
not brought into play so that the signifier "propre" is articulated only 
within a network of objects and bodies and not within an additional 
network of discourses and conventions. 
Similarly, the terms "même" and "autre," which produce 
overlappings in French between oppositions around the semantic fields 
of self/other and same/different, are translated by one of the possible 
English signifiers, so that in the context of the discussion of the 
shadows in the Platonic cave, "les (mêmes) autres" (Irigaray, 1974, p. 
338) is rendered as "the (like) others" (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 272) with the 
result that, in English, the question of mimesis is separated from that of 
subjectivity and sexual difference. It is just the collapsing of boundaries 
between these discursive categories that the French text stages. So too 
it is the polysémie contamination of the room or enclosure of the 
philosopher's enforced shadow-play by the concepts of passage, 
movement and change which is staged in the overlapping of "enceinte" 
as enclosure and pregnant and of "antre" (Irigaray, 1974, p. 347) as 
cave and in-between ("entre"), cave and womb ("ventre"). Translated 
as "stronghold" and "den" (Irigaray, 1985a, pp. 278-279), the play of the 
signifier is fixed in a singular "proper" meaning, ironically playing out 
the scenario of the philosopher "trapped in a single metaphorical 
project" (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 279) which this text is trying to unfix by 
staging a scenario in which everyone is caught up in a "mimodrame," 
in "mimétisme" or "mimicry" (Irigaray, 1974, p. 349; 1985a, p. 280), 
where there is no single "proper" meaning but only fictions of identity 
(Irigaray, 1985a, p. 281) contingent on gender. 
The philosopher's construction of himself as transcendental 
subject through the re-covery of a singular meaning is figured by 
Irigaray as a gendered act of "re-con-naissance," metonymy that is 
repressed by the metaphorical project. In these cases of polysemy, there 
115 
are obvious difficulties in translation since the semantic fields of 
English and French terms are different Various compensatory 
strategies of non-translation have been deployed by Catherine Porter in 
her later translation of This Sex Which Is Not One, notably the addition 
of a glossary which gives a detailed explanation of the multiple 
signifieds for the signifiers in question. Another such strategy which 
foregrounds the polysemy in the act of reading is to cite all the 
possibilities at each textual occurrence (Cixous, 1986, p. 80). Neolo-
gisms might be produced to foreground such work on the signifier, as 
with "knowing herself cunt birth" for "re-con-naissance" (Cixous, 1986, 
p. 91). Or polysemy might be introduced where such possibilities 
present themselves in the target language as in "booby trapped silence" 
for "silence piégé" (Cixous, 1986, p. 93). This is the strategy of 
translating by "lapse and bounds" as Betsy Wing puns in English to 
reproduce the signifying effect of Cixous's text in The Newly Born 
Woman. "Winging it" in order to "voler" language. 
The model for this translation practice is the text manipulated 
by Cixous and her colleagues, vivre V orange which literally "does 
languages" as it "makes language" ("Je fais des langues" Cixous, 1979, 
p. 21). This text responds to the "éclat" of "Clarice" (Lispector) 
(Cixous, 1979, p. 27) with a movement into the other that results in a 
(con)founding of languages, voices, texts. A theory of translation as 
combination is elaborated in this text in the contamination of French, 
Portuguese and English, as Cixous follows the course of the orange, "a 
beginning" (Cixous, 1979, p. 20) from which all courses are possible 
including the recognition that "the love of the orange is political" 
(Cixous, 1979, p. 26) as well as the return to the source — "All the 
orient is orange" (Cixous, 1979, p. 32) — through the bright colours of 
Inspector's Brazil back into her own childhood world of North Africa 
with its succulent and brilliant blood-oranges, and through the chain of 
signifiers in a phonetic translation to "Qran-je," and her birth city Oran, 
on to a reflection on the permeability of boundaries in "I/ran" (Cixous, 
1979, pp. 31-32). Sound chases sound, slips under the noun and merges 
with all forms (Cixous, 1979, p. 37). 
Reaching out with the tongue into the translation of the orange 
into apple is to move toward Edenic innocence, implicated in a double 
movement which is mis-translation. The phrase "love of orange," 
116 
guiding principle in her immersion course in other tongues, other 
languages, is at the root of her guilt, is "Original Sin," because the 
apple has been situated in the beginning, an apple in the darkness. In 
the "translation of the apple (into orange) I try to denounce myself 
(Cixous, 1979, p. 40). This desire to become "simple as an apple," 
where all is play and pleasure, is not to encounter innocence, but guilt, 
alterity. The encounter with Clarice involves the recognition that "Far 
from the orange... I am unforgiveable. I am foreinge" (Cixous, 1979, 
p. 40). Despite the assonance, "origin" is far from "orange" (Cixous 
1979,14): it is instead "foreinge." The continual slippage of signifiers 
foregrounds the aporia of translation. Everything is the same; every-
thing is different, foreign. Everything is translation: nothing is translata-
ble. 
The problem of writing, of doing languages, is framed as a 
problem of translation: "Comment s'appeler à l'étranger" which is 
translated as "How to call oneself abroad?" (Cixous, 1979, p. 36). A 
broad? This is rephrased as "How to call myself a woman?" (Cixous, 
1979, p. 38). The orange here is an "open, bottomless species" that 
"keeps alive and circulates, with life, death, women, forms, volumes, 
movement, matter, the ways of metamorphoses..." (Cixous, 1979, p. 18; 
p. 16). This is the work of translation, to "re-knew" connections 
(Cixous, 1979, p. 52) and animate fragments. This is the work of 
Clarice as writer who goes into the darkeness with hands like voices 
and "holds words out in the direction of things like infinitely moving 
fingers, finding directions, sense." Clarice "en son-je," Clarice "en 
songe" and using sound, the polysémie possibilities of language, calls 
the reader in foreign names, helps one to become "self-strange" and 
come to language (Cixous, 1979, p. 38). "Laranja" she calls the canvas 
for the text, the orange, oran-je, laranja, langue, "Lalgeria": "naranja, 
she translated it into my tongue, and I rediscovered the taste of the lost 
orange, I re-knew the orange" (Cixous, 1979, p. 52). The flash, the 
"éclair" of Clarice, or the translation effect, forges connections across 
languages, between texts, as the one goes out into the other, (con)fuses 
as the one within the other. 
Cixous's text is a both a meditation on and a staging of transla-
ting with the signifier, moving between Portuguese and French and 
opening up the possibilities for creation through the encounter with 
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difference. The English version of the text compounds the translation 
effect, by proliferating the play among three languages, developing the 
polysémie possilities in English with the neologism "foreinge" and the 
changed spelling of "re-knew." As well, the translation foregrounds its 
foreigness by translating for the letter, introducing "regards" in a 
passage where "looks" would have been more colloquial (Cixous, 1979, 
p. 24) and leaving "Mongolfier" sitting like a boulder in a field after the 
passage of a French glacier (Cixous, 1979, p. 22). Then there is the 
attempt to maintain some of the polysemy in phrases such as "toutes les 
relations de sens que toute orange maintient en vie" which becomes 
"including all the sense relations that every orange keeps alive" (Cixous, 
1979, p. 17; p. 16). While "senses" loses its meaning of direction 
where it is retained, it slips and slides between "meaning" and "sense," 
a knot of associations central to vivre l'orange where the impossibility 
of "proper meaning" is staged through the processes of associative 
linking around the senses of hearing, seeing, touching and smelling the 
orange. Here the translators have opted to restage the combinatory work 
along the phonemic chain rather than fix on a single meaning. 
What I have been exploring here are the contrasting effects of 
translating for the signified (under the reign of metaphor) and transla-
ting for the signifier (under the reign of metonymy). In the former, the 
sign of translation is written as a double sign, similar to that of 
metaphor, where Se is attached to both Sal and Sa2. In the second 
case, translation attentive to the letter, following from signifier to 
signifier, proliferates new possible signifiées with each new configura-
tion of signifîers, so that Sal and Sa2 produce SeI, Se2, Se3, etc. The 
slippage of signifîers is endless. The virtual potentials for signifieds are 
constrained by the contingencies of the specific actualization, but as in 
a combinatory, may be reorganized and actualized in new configura-
tions. Translating for the letter opens up the play of the signifier 
beyond the "literal" meaning of the word. This is the work of the 
metaphor that is not a metaphor, but a metonymy. The translation that 
is not a translation, but a contamination, a hybrid, touching on, living 
on... The (im)possibility of translation/theory. 
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